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1. Introduction 
Privatization is a global phenomenon. It is a significant strategic policy for some countries, 
and nothing short of a revolution for others. Researchers have looked at various aspects of 
privatization. We here focus on one particular issue: how to privatize. The experiences of big-
bang and gradual reforms have proven this issue to be important. All privatizations serve the 
same purpose: transform a state-owned enterprise (SOE) into a well-functioning market-
based firm. In this paper, we identify an incomplete-contract approach that can transform an 
SOE into an efficient market-based firm. We have also conducted empirical analysis using 
data from the recent Chinese privatization program, yielding supporting evidence for our 
theory. 
Privatizations around the world are typically carried out in one of three ways: asset sale, 
voucher privatization, or share issue privatization (Bonin & Wachtel, 2003). In an asset sale, 
the government sells ownership of an SOE directly to an existing private firm, an institution or 
a small group of individuals. Such deals are typically made through direct face-to-face negotia-
tions. In a voucher privatization, the government distributes vouchers (paper claims of owner-
ship) to citizens. These vouchers are usually free, or almost free, and are available to most 
citizens. In a share issue privatization (SIP), the government sells equity shares to the public. 
The government may sell a fraction or all of an SOE through any one of these methods. Asset 
sales occur more commonly in developing economies involving small SOEs and are prone to 
corruption. Voucher privatizations occur mainly in transition economies and the results are 
mostly disappointing. SIP is the dominant form of privatization in terms of asset value, espe-
cially for large SOEs and for countries with well-developed capital markets, such as European 
countries and Japan. For example, the Spanish government raises more than 83% of privatiza-
tion revenue from SIPs. SIPs can also be used to jump-start the development of a nation’s 
stock market, such as that for China.  
Prior studies have shown that most privatizations in practice are carried out through a 
multi-stage process in which shares are temporarily locked up. Perotti (1995, Table 2) found 
many cases of staged privatization in the UK. Biais & Perotti (2002) noted that measures are 
often in place in privatization schemes that make it costly or even impossible to resell the 
shares of recently privatized firms quickly. Most shares of privatized firms are initially non-
tradable, are distributed through a pension scheme or are placed under a reward scheme for 
long-term holdings. Countries where privatized firms exhibit such features include France, the 
U.K., Czech Republic, Turkey, Mongolia, Bolivia, Zambia, Morocco, Nigeria, Tunisia, Jamaica, 
Chile, Mexico, Argentina, and Columbia. The reward schemes tend to exist in Western coun-
tries (e.g., the U.K.) and the pension schemes in South American countries. Bortolotti et al. 
(2003) also indicated that partial sales are a common feature of privatization processes. Gupta 
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(2005) observed that most privatizations begin with a period of partial privatization in which 
only non-controlling portions of firms are sold on the stock market. Jones et al. (1999) ob-
served that only 11.5% of the firms in 59 countries sold all of their capital at once through SIP 
and less than 30% sold more than half of their capital in the initial public offering (IPO). The 
general belief is that, privatization—when done right—works well. Across countries, those with 
well-developed markets tend to do well in privatization, such as New Zealand, the UK, Mexico 
and Chile.  
British Telecom, for example, was completely privatized in stages. An IPO of 50.2% of its 
shares in 1984 was followed by two secondary offerings in 1991 and 1993. The privatization of 
British Telecom was the largest equity offering in history at the time and considered to be one 
of the most successful privatizations in the world. This privatization is believed to have trig-
gered other privatization programs around the world. The Japanese Nippon Telegraph and 
Telephone (NTT) was partially privatized in stages. The process involved an IPO in 1985 and 
two subsequent secondary offerings in late 1987 and 1988, leaving 51% of NTT shares in the 
hands of the government. The privatization of NTT set a new record for IPO issue size at that 
time.  
Why should privatization be staged? Why is an SOE not sold all at once? What is the role 
of a lockup? There are a few theoretical papers on these issues. Different authors present 
different arguments on the practice of staged privatization. Zou (1994) studied dynamic pri-
vatization in a growth model, with an endogenous time span of privatization as we do. In his 
paper, convergence to a market-based firm is determined by the adjustment cost of privatiza-
tion and the efficiency difference between SOEs and privately owned firms. We focus on the 
incentive to the insiders in restructuring effort. The restructuring includes establishing an 
effective board of directors, introducing strategic partners, and ensuring a profit-oriented 
management. A key technical difference between our model and the existing literature, includ-
ing Zou (1994), is that the speed of privatization is endogenous in our model but exogenous in 
those of others. In fact, this speed of privatization is a crucial incentive instrument in our 
model.  
Perotti (1995) further observed that SOEs in both developed and developing countries are 
mostly privatized through a sequence of partial and staggering sales. In addition, Perotti found 
that governments often temporarily take a risk-bearing role even well after the transfer of 
control to the private sector. Perotti proposed two explanations for these behaviors. One is the 
existence of temporary market capacity constraints (downward sloping demand). The other is 
based on a confidence-building strategy on the part of the government in its willingness to 
retain a stake in the firm. The latter is explained as follows. The government may or may not 
demand tax earnings from private shares (those shares of an SOE sold to private individuals). 
If the government does not sell the firm all at once, its tax revenue from the firm will be lower, 
which may indicate that this government has no intention of taxing earnings from the shares. 
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Hence, partial privatization can serve as a signal of a no-tax government. In a separating 
equilibrium, a no-tax government uses staged privatization, while a taxing government uses 
one-time privatization. The tax reduces the firm’s incentive to invest. Hence, this equilibrium 
may explain why more often than not governments privatize SOEs in stages. Notice that Perot-
ti treated the length of lockup as exogenous, with a portion of the shares being sold at 𝑡 = 1 
and the rest being sold at 𝑡 = 2. In contrast, the lockup in our model is endogenous. 
There are a few other studies on staged privatization. Katz & Owen (1995) treated an SOE 
as an asset for sale, which the government needs to package before selling, including providing 
sufficient ownership for the buyer and enough subsidy for the firm. Boycko, Shleifer & Vishny 
(1996) studied privatization by a divided government. Cornelli & Li (1997) presented an auc-
tion model, in which the optimal privatization scheme uses the number of shares sold as an 
instrument to attract the most valuable investors. Vickers & Yarrow (1988) and Jenkinson & 
Mayer (1994) suggested selling firms in tranches, instead of selling them in one go. Schmitz 
(2000) identified conditions under which private ownership, government ownership or partial 
ownership can be optimal. Biais & Perotti (2002) analyzed a political process of privatization 
in a democracy. There are also some empirical studies that test these theories, including Perot-
ti & Guney (1993), Dewenter & Malatesta (1997), Bel (1998), Farinós et al. (2007), and Huy-
ghebaert & Quan (2009, 2011). Bel (1998) and Farinós et al. (2007) offered evidence from 
Spain supporting staged privatization. Huyghebaert & Quan (2009, 2011) showed many sub-
stantial differences between SIPs and private-firm IPOs. One key difference between prior 
literature and our theory is that prior literature studies a fully government-controlled privati-
zation process, while we propose a market-oriented one, which is particularly relevant to 
developed economies with well-developed markets. Further, by specifying a lockup effect on 
demand, Jiang & Wang (2012) analyzed how various factors such as the lockup effect, demand 
elasticity, growth potential and business fluctuations affect staged privatization for Chinese 
privatizations. One key difference between our theory and theirs is that our scheme successful-
ly transforms an SOE into an efficient market-based firm while theirs may or may not.   
We consider a privatization program with two steps, with the objective of transforming an 
SOE into an efficient market-based firm. In the first step, the firm is divided into equity shares, 
with a portion of the shares being sold to the public. These shares are tradable on the stock 
market and the rest are nontradable. After the first step, the SOE becomes a partially privat-
ized SOE. In the second step, the government allows the nontradable shares to become trada-
ble after a lockup period. In the literature, such as Perotti (1995), the length of the lockup 
period is exogenous. In our model, however, there are multiple stages of lockup and the length 
of each lockup period is endogenous (an optimal choice). On the unlock day, a nontradable 
shareholder optimally unlocks a portion of her shares and locks up the rest for a further opti-
mal length of time. This setup is more consistent with practice. Our endogenously determined 
lockups imply the equilibrium speed of staged privatization—a key feature of our model. For 
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example, if the economic environment experiences a downturn, the speed of privatization will 
automatically be reduced as each nontradable shareholder will choose to lock up her remain-
ing shares for a longer period of time. Also, our empirical analysis shows that nontradable 
shareholders of SOEs choose statistically the same lockup lengths as nontradable shareholders 
of non-SOEs, implying that their behavior is determined by market principles. This means 
that privatization in our model is a market process, while in prior literature privatization is a 
centrally planned process. 
Our study aims at developing a unique theory to explain staged privatization. Different 
from prior literature, we focus on efficient privatization. In our theoretical analysis, we show 
that an incomplete-contract approach with an ex-post lockup option implies efficient privati-
zation (Proposition 1). This approach yields a multi-stage privatization resembling many 
privatizations around the world, including the hugely successful one that has been carried out 
by the Chinese since 1990. In contrast, a complete-contract approach with an ex-ante lockup 
decision implies inefficient privatization (Proposition 4). This latter approach yields a one-
time upfront privatization resembling the Russian privatization and some privatizations in 
Eastern Europe.  
China offers a good example of extensive and successful privatizations and a rich set of 
data for our empirical analysis. Starting in 1990, every listed firm (including non-SOEs) except 
four was divided into tradable and nontradable shares. As a SIP, the Chinese capital market in 
2005 was defined by a split-share structure, with about one third of domestically listed shares 
being tradable and the rest being nontradable. Then in 2005, the government announced the 
second privatization step, the split-share reform (SS reform), in which all nontradable shares 
became tradable shares after an initial lockup. The unlocking of nontradable shares is imple-
mented over time based on certain qualification guidelines. Up to 2008, a total of 65 groups of 
firms had become qualified for unlocking, which consists of about 90% of the listed firms. This 
privatization has turned out to be one of resounding success. With rich data from the Chinese 
privatization, we have conducted an empirical study on our theory. In our empirical analysis, 
for firms that went through the SS reform before the end of 2006 (more than 90% of all listed 
firms), we show that the ones that did so earlier have higher ROA (return on assets), ROE 
(return on equity), and MB (market to book value). This is consistent with the prediction of 
our theory that the performance of a partially privatized SOE is as a criterion for early unlock-
ing of the firm’s nontradable shares.  
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we set up the model. In Section 3, we pre-
sent the theory. In Section 4, we extend the theory. In Section 5, we conduct empirical analysis 
using data on listed firms in the Chinese stock market. We conclude the paper in Section 6. 
The proofs are all given in the Appendix.  
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2. The Model 
The Reform Program 
Consider a privatization program with two steps and the objective of transforming an SOE 
into an efficient market-based firm. In the first step, the firm is divided into equity shares, 
with a proper portion 𝜃 of the shares being sold to the public. These shares are tradable (called 
T-shares) on the stock market and the rest are nontradable (called N-shares). Each share 
guarantees one share of output. Holders of the T-shares are called T-holders and holders of 
the N-shares are called N-holders. After the first step, the SOE becomes a partially privatized 
SOE. In the second step, the government allows the N-shares in the partially privatized SOE to 
become tradable after a lockup period, where the lockup policy is based on the SOE’s restruc-
turing effort. 
The Objective of Privatization: Efficiency 
Specifically, consider a privatization program in interval [0,  1], where the program starts 
at 𝑡 = 0 and output is produced at 𝑡 = 1. There is one T-holder (representing private share-
holders) and one N-holder (representing insiders or controlling shareholders). The production 
function is 
𝑦 = 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘), 
where 𝑎 is the effort from the N-holder and 𝑘 is the capital stock. Assume that 𝑎 is nonverifia-
ble ex ante but observable ex post. 3 Since 𝑎 is nonverifiable ex ante, the government cannot 
impose 𝑎 ex ante; it has to provide incentives to induce a certain 𝑎. Since 𝑎 is observable ex 
post, an ex-post government policy can depend on it. These two government behaviors are 
consistent with observations in practice. We call 𝑎 the restructuring effort. The costs for these 
two inputs are 𝑐(𝑎) and 𝑘. Given the real interest rate (the rental rate of capital) 𝑟, efficiency is 
determined by 

𝑓𝑎(𝑎
∗, 𝑘∗) = 𝑐′(𝑎∗),           𝑓𝑘(𝑎
∗, 𝑘∗) = 𝑟, (1) 
where 𝑓𝑎  and 𝑓𝑘  are partial derivatives of 𝑓  with respect to 𝑎  and 𝑘 , respectively. The first 
equation in (1) means that the owners/insiders of the firm invest efficiently in the firm; the 
second equation implies that the firm uses capital efficiently. 
The government’s objective is to transform a firm into an efficient market-based firm, as 
defined by (1). Given the objective in (1), in the following, we propose a two-stage privatization 
program starting at 𝑡 = 0 that transforms the firm into a market-based firm by the end of the 
                                                        
3 The original explanation of statements “nonverifiable ex ante but observable ex post” and “ex-ante nonveri-
fiable but ex-post verifiable” is available in Grossman & Hart (1986). 
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reform process at 𝑡 = 1. The key is the nonverifiable restructuring effort 𝑎—the reform pro-
gram needs to provide sufficient incentives for the controlling shareholders to spend effort on 
restructuring.  
The Reform Strategy: Staged Privatization 
At 𝑡 = 0, the government announces a reform policy as defined by the initial proportion 𝜃 
of tradable shares. Assume that 𝜃 is verifiable ex ante, which means that the government can 
impose 𝜃 ex ante. Sometime later after the government has observed 𝑎, the government an-
nounces another reform policy as defined by a lockup length 𝜆. We assume that 𝜆 is ex-ante 
nonverifiable, i.e., the government cannot commit to 𝜆 ex ante but it can impose 𝜆 ex post. 
Since 𝑎 is observed before 𝜆 is decided, 𝜆 can be made dependent on 𝑎. Function 𝜆(𝑎) means 
that the government will allow a firm to unlock its N-shares ex post at 𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑎) only if the firm 
has completed restructuring up to the level 𝑎 or above.  
Thus, the ex-ante reform policy is 𝜃 and the ex-post reform policy is 𝜆(⋅). At 𝑡 = 1, the firm 
is completely operating under market forces, as shown in Figure 1. This process can be rigor-
ously defined by an incomplete contract at 𝑡 = 0 in which the government imposes 𝜃 ex ante 
and retains the right to decide 𝜆 ex post. One key feature of an incomplete contract is that it 
can contain rights to decide certain matters ex post. 
0
Ex Ante Ex Post
First-Stage
Reform Policy q
Second-Stage
Reform Policy ( )l ×
a
( )al 1
Output  ( , )f a k
 
Figure 1. The Timeline of the Privatization Scheme 
Demand for Shares 
Holders of tradable shares can trade their shares. However, different shareholders have 
different discount rates 𝛿 ∈ (0, 1) of time preference. All shareholders want the opportunity to 
trade their shares; they want to sell their shares to those who have a larger 𝛿 (less discount on 
future) than their own. 
It is known in many studies that the demand for shares is downward sloping at any mo-
ment in time (Perotti, 1995; Field & Hanka, 2001; Brav & Gompers, 2003). We now model this 
demand by heterogeneous time preferences among shareholders. Each holder has a certain 
discount on the future. If her N-shares can be unlocked earlier, she can sell them earlier to a 
person whose discount factor is larger. In practice, the rates of time preference can be very 
different among people. That is, less optimistic holders sell shares to more optimistic holders. 
For example, an elderly may have a much higher discount on the future than a young person. 
Page 8 of 34 
If the income from a share paid at 𝑡 = 1 is 𝑦 for a holder with a rate of time preference 𝜌 per 
unit of time, the share at 𝑡 is worth 𝑦𝑒−𝜌(1−𝑡) = 𝑦𝛿1−𝑡, where 𝛿 ≡ 𝑒−𝜌. We call 𝛿 a measure of 
the person’s time preference on future income. A larger 𝛿 means less discount on future in-
come. Hence, anyone with time preference 𝛿 ≥ 𝛿 will be willing to buy the share at price 𝑝𝑡 ≡
𝑦𝛿1−𝑡 at time 𝑡 ∈ [0, 1). Suppose that the potential demand or the total market interest in the 
stock is 𝑛 shares and the total supply of shares is one unit, where  
𝑛 = the total number of buyers in the market 
if each buyer buys at most one share. Let the density of potential demand be 𝐹(𝛿), for 𝛿 ∈ [0,
1]. Then, the total demand at price 𝑝𝑡 is 𝑛[1 − 𝐹(𝛿)]. Hence, the demand function for shares at 
time 𝑡 is  
 𝑥𝑡(𝑝𝑡) = 𝑛[1 − 𝐹(𝛿)] = 𝑛 {1 − 𝐹 [(
𝑝𝑡
𝑦
)
1
1−𝑡
]}. 
This demand is downward sloping in price.  
3. Staged Privatization as an Efficient Solution 
In this section, we identify an efficient solution based on an incomplete contract between 
the government and the firm. The solution is a multi-stage privatization program. 
The First Stage of Privatization 
In the first stage, the focus of the reform is to raise enough capital for the firm. Instead of 
relying on the government to provide funding, once the reform process is started, the firm will 
be financially on its own and it will be allowed to retain its own revenue. 
Specifically, in the first stage, the government sells a portion 𝜃 of the firm’s shares to the 
public. With the demand function in (2), the demand for shares at 𝑡 = 0 is 
𝑥0(𝑝) = 𝑛 [1 − 𝐹 (
𝑝
𝑦
)] .  
Given the supply 𝜃 of shares in the market, the equilibrium condition in the stock market is  
𝑥0(𝑝0) = 𝜃, 
which determines the equilibrium share price at 𝑡 = 0: 
𝑝0 = 𝑦𝐹
−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
). 
Hence, the financial capital raised from the initial share issue is 
𝑘 = 𝑝0𝜃 = 𝜃𝑦𝐹
−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
). 
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Therefore, to achieve efficient privatization, given the first-best investments 𝑎∗ and 𝑘∗ defined 
in (1), the government chooses 𝜃 ∈ [0,  1] such that 
 𝑘
∗ = 𝜃𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗)𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
). 
If 𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗) > 𝑘∗, by Lemma 1 in the Appendix, when 𝑛 is large enough, we can guarantee the 
existence and uniqueness of 𝜃 that satisfies (3). 
One advantage of this staged privatization is that it allows the firm to raise enough work-
ing capital in the first stage. This working capital is necessary for transforming the firm into an 
efficient market-based firm in the second stage. 
The Second Stage of Privatization 
In the second stage, the reform is based on a government’s lockup policy 𝜆(𝑎). Given the 
government’s policies {𝜃, 𝜆(𝑎)}, the N-holder considers her optimization problem. On the one 
hand, with her effort 𝑎, the N-holder is allowed to sell up to 1 − 𝜃 shares at time 𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑎). By 
(2), the demand at 𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑎) is 
𝑥𝜆(𝑝) = 𝑛 {1 − 𝐹 [(
𝑝
𝑦
)
1
1−𝜆
]}. 
Since the total supply of shares in the market is 1 at 𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑎), the equilibrium condition is  
𝑛 {1 − 𝐹 [(
𝑝𝜆
𝑦
)
1
1−𝜆
]} = 1, 
which implies the share price at 𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑎): 
𝑝𝜆 = 𝑦 [𝐹
−1 (1 −
1
𝑛
)]
1−𝜆
. 
On the other hand, at 𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑎), if the N-holder has discount factor 𝛿, a share is worth 𝑦𝛿1−𝜆 to 
her if she holds on to the share. Hence, the N-holder will sell shares if and only if 𝑦𝛿1−𝜆 ≤ 𝑝𝜆 
or 𝛿 ≤ 𝛿𝑛, where  
 𝛿𝑛 ≡ 𝐹
−1 (1 −
1
𝑛
). 
This 𝛿𝑛 is the upper bound of the time preference of the shareholders who prefer to sell their 
shares.4 Hence, for an N-holder with effort 𝑎 and time preference 𝛿 ≤ 𝛿𝑛, her payoff at 𝑡 = 0 is  

𝜋𝑁(𝑎) = 𝑝𝜆(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆 − 𝑐(𝑎) = 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆(𝑎) − 𝑐(𝑎). (5) 
                                                        
4 If 𝑛 → ∞, then 𝛿𝑛 → 1; that is, virtually any N-holder will sell her shares in a large economy. If so, an N-
holder can always find a buyer who would prefer to pay a higher price than her own valuation. 
Page 10 of 34 
The key question is whether or not she is willing to make a large enough effort 𝑎 to improve 
the firm before she is allowed to sell her shares in the firm. To induce the N-holder to make a 
sufficient amount 𝑎∗ of effort, the lockup policy 𝜆(⋅) needs to be properly designed. We indeed 
find such a 𝜆(⋅) in the following.  
The Solution 
The following proposition states that the above privatization scheme can lead to an effi-
cient solution. The proof is in the Appendix. 
Proposition 1. A staged privatization program {𝜃, 𝜆(⋅)} can transform a firm into an effi-
cient firm with the first-best investments 𝑎∗ and 𝑘∗ if the N-holders of the firm (the original 
owners of the firm) have time preference 𝛿 satisfying  
 𝛿 ≤ 𝛿𝑛 −
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)
𝑎∗
0
 , 
where the amount 𝜃 of tradable shares in the first stage of privatization is determined by 
 𝑘
∗ = 𝜃𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗)𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
), 
and the lockup policy in the second stage of privatization is defined by 

𝜆(𝑎) =
{
  
 
  
 
 
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln [𝛿 +
1
1 − 𝜃∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)
𝑎
0
]
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
,   if  𝑎 < 𝑎∗,
 
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln [𝛿 +
1
1 − 𝜃∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)
𝑎∗
0
]
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
,   if  𝑎 ≥ 𝑎∗.  ∎
 

The privatization steps in Proposition 1 are just like those in a typical SIP in practice. In 
the first stage, the government sells a portion of the equity shares of a privatizing firm to the 
public. In the second stage, after several years, the government allows the firms to unlock N-
shares in steps and sell them in the secondary market. Our theory indicates that this privatiza-
tion scheme can transform an SOE into an efficient market-based firm at the completion of 
the program. 
The lockup policy in (8) is decreasing and, if the marginal cost of effort is constant, it is al-
so convex, as shown in Figure 2. A decreasing 𝜆(𝑎) means that a firm with higher investment 𝑎 
will be allowed to unlock its N-shares earlier, so firms are enticed to invest more for the oppor-
tunity to unlock their shares early. A convex 𝜆(𝑎) means that the reward of early unlocking is 
diminishing with investment. By conditioning the unlocking of N-shares on investments, the 
government can induce sufficient investments from SOEs’ original owners or insiders in the 
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first stage of privatization, since the more investments the SOEs make, the sooner they can sell 
their N-shares to the market and make more profits. This finding is consistent with Gupta et al. 
(2008).  
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Figure 2. The Lockup Policy in Staged Privatization 
In this scheme, the unlock time 𝜆(𝑎∗) is announced after 𝑎∗ is invested. Proposition 1 indi-
cates that leaving the timing of the unlocking of N-shares open ex ante can induce efficient 
incentives in restructuring. In contrast, as shown in Proposition 4, if the lockup is decided ex 
ante, the solution is inefficient.  
The government allows only those firms that have undergone sufficient restructuring to 
unlock their N-shares. In equilibrium, all the owners with preferences satisfying (6) are ex-
pected to choose 𝑎 = 𝑎∗ and hence are allowed to unlock their N-shares at 𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑎∗). In prac-
tice, to implement this privatization scheme, 𝜆(𝑎∗) can be stated as the minimum lockup 
length. More efficient firms are unlocked earlier; only the least efficient ones would have a 
prolonged lockup period. 
A condition such as (6) is necessary for the government’s incentive scheme to work. For 
those N-holders who view the current and future incomes as basically the same, this scheme 
cannot work. As the later two propositions will show, in a risky and large economy, the scheme 
can work for virtually all firms. 
Our theory is consistent with the general assessment of privatization in the literature: pri-
vatization, when done properly, works well. There are extensive empirical findings supporting 
this assessment, including Kikeri et al. (1992), Shirley (1992), Megginson et al. (1994), Bel 
(1998) and Farinós et al. (2007) who offer evidence showing efficiency improvement after 
staged privatization.  
Remark 1. In the model, the N-holders receive N-shares for free. In reality, some receive N-
shares for free while others get them for a small price. It is simple to modify the model to take 
the latter into account. The result is not affect since a charge on N-shares is equivalent to a 
upfront monetary transfer.  
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Remark 2. The government’s lockup policy 𝜆 can also be based on a more general signal of 
the form 𝜙(𝑎) + 𝜀̃ with noise 𝜀̃ as long as the signal is observable ex post and 𝜙 is 1-1. Here 𝜙 
being 1-1 implies that the signal can fully reveal 𝑎, and the signal being ex post observable 
means that the noise 𝜀̃ is known at the time when the lockup policy is formulated. 
Remark 3. We can allow an initial capital stock 𝑘0 so that the production function becomes 
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘0 + 𝑘), where 𝑘 is the additional capital raised by an initial share sale in addition to the 
existing stock 𝑘0. The same result holds.  
Remark 4. The T-holder’s individual rationality (IR) condition can be guaranteed by a up-
front financial transfer. After the announcement of the government policy (𝜃, 𝜆(⋅)) at 𝑡 = 0, 
both parties know the solution (𝑘∗, 𝑎∗) and the resulting social welfare 𝑊∗ in equilibrium, and 
they can bargain for a financial transfer. With Nash bargaining, the N-holder’s payoff becomes 
𝜋𝑁(𝑎) − 𝜌𝑊
∗ instead of 𝜋𝑁(𝑎) in (5), where 𝜌𝑊
∗ is the financial transfer from the N-holder to 
the T-holder and 𝜌 ∈ [0, 1]. Since this 𝜌 is set upfront, this financial transfer 𝜌𝑊∗ has no effect 
on the solution (𝑘∗, 𝑎∗).  Since this 𝜌 is arbitrary to our model, we can find a 𝜌 to ensure the IR 
conditions for both the T-holder and N-holder (as long as 𝑊∗ > 0, such a 𝜌 exists). If the T-
holder’s IR condition is satisfied, he will approve the government’s privatization scheme.  
4. Extensions 
4.1. Staged Privatization under Uncertainty  
In this section, we introduce uncertainty into the model. We show that uncertainty will 
not change our conclusion.  
Suppose that output is uncertain ex ante with 

?̃? = ?̃?𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘), (9) 
where 𝐸(?̃?) = 1 and var(?̃?) = 𝜎2. Suppose that an N-holder has mean-variance preferences of 
the form:  
𝑢(?̃?) = 𝐸(?̃?) − 𝛽var(?̃?) = 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘) − 𝛽𝜎2[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘)]2. 
Here, 𝛽 is a measure of risk aversion and 𝜎 is a measure of risk. We assume that all the share-
holders have the same risk preference (the same 𝛽).5  
                                                        
5 Like time preferences, we can also consider a distribution of heterogeneous risk preferences among the 
shareholders. The main result still holds. In fact, heterogeneous time preferences have arguably included heteroge-
neous risk preferences as a special case. 
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The government’s objective is again to transform the firm into an ex-ante efficient firm. 
That is, given the real interest rate 𝑟, the government will try to transform the firm into a 
market-based firm as defined by 
𝑓𝑎(𝑎
∗, 𝑘∗) = 𝑐′(𝑎∗),         𝑓𝑘(𝑎
∗, 𝑘∗) = 𝑟. 
Each share for a shareholder with time preference 𝛿 is worth 𝑢(?̃?)𝛿1−𝑡 at 𝑡. Anyone with 
time preference 𝛿 ≥ 𝛿 will be willing to buy the share at price 𝑝𝑡 ≡ 𝑢(?̃?)𝛿
1−𝑡 at 𝑡. Suppose that 
the potential demand or the total market interest in the stock is 𝑛 shares and the total supply 
of shares is one unit. Let the density of potential demand be 𝐹(𝛿), for 𝛿 ∈ [0, 1]. Then, the 
total demand at the price 𝑝𝑡 is 𝑛[1 − 𝐹(𝛿)]. Hence, the demand function for shares at 𝑡 is  
𝑥𝑡(𝑝𝑡) = 𝑛[1 − 𝐹(𝛿)] = 𝑛 {1 − 𝐹 [(
𝑝𝑡
𝑢(?̃?)
)
1
1−𝑡
]}. 
We have a downward sloping demand. 
In the first stage, the government sells a portion 𝜃 of the firm’s shares to the market. With 
the total supply of shares in the market being 𝜃 at 𝑡 = 0, the equilibrium share price is 
𝑝0 = 𝑢(?̃?)𝐹
−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
). 
Hence, the financial capital raised from the initial share issue is 
𝑘 = 𝑝0𝜃 = 𝑢(?̃?)𝐹
−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
)𝜃. 
Then, the government should choose 𝜃 such that 
 𝑘
∗ = 𝜃[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗)]𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗)𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
). 
If 𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗) > 𝑘∗, when 𝑛 is large enough, we can guarantee the existence and uniqueness of 𝜃. 
In the second stage, the reform is based on a government’s lockup policy 𝜆(𝑎). Given the 
government’s policies {𝜃, 𝜆(𝑎)}, the N-holder considers her optimization problem. With her 
effort 𝑎, she will be allowed to sell up to 1 − 𝜃 shares at date 𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑎). With the total supply of 
shares in the market being 1 at 𝑡 = 𝜆(𝑎), the equilibrium price is  
𝑝𝜆 = 𝑢(?̃?) [𝐹
−1 (1 −
1
𝑛
)]
1−𝜆
. 
If the N-holder has discount factor 𝛿, each share is worth 𝑢(?̃?)𝛿1−𝜆 to her if she does not sell 
the share. This shareholder will sell shares if 𝑢(?̃?)𝛿1−𝜆 ≤ 𝑝𝜆 or 𝛿 ≤ 𝛿𝑛, where 𝛿𝑛 is defined in 
(4). Hence, for an N-holder with time preference 𝛿 ≤ 𝛿𝑛, her payoff at 𝑡 = 0 is  
 𝜋𝑁(𝑎) = 𝑝𝜆(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆 − 𝑐(𝑎) = [1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘)]𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆(𝑎) − 𝑐(𝑎). 
As shown in the following proposition, we again find an efficient solution. The proof is shown 
in the Appendix. 
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Proposition 2. A staged privatization program {𝜃, 𝜆(⋅)} can transform a firm into an effi-
cient firm with the first-best investments 𝑎∗ and 𝑘∗ if the N-holder of the firm has time pref-
erence 𝛿 satisfying 
 𝛿 ≤ 𝛿𝑛 −
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)]
𝑎∗
0
, 
where the amount 𝜃 of tradable shares in the first stage of privatization is determined by 
𝑘∗ = 𝜃[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗)]𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗)𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
), 
and the lockup policy in the second stage of privatization is defined by 
𝜆(𝑎) =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln{𝛿 +
1
1 − 𝜃∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)]
𝑎
0
}
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
   if  𝑎 < 𝑎∗,
 
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln{𝛿 +
1
1 − 𝜃∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)]
𝑎∗
0
}
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
  if  𝑎 ≥ 𝑎∗.   ∎
 
 
Similarly, instead of proportional uncertainty in (9), suppose that output has the follow-
ing additive form:  

?̃? = 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘) + 𝜀̃, (13) 
where 𝐸(𝜀̃) = 0 and var(𝜀̃) = 𝜎2. Again, suppose that the N-holder has mean-variance prefer-
ences of the form  
𝑢(?̃?) = 𝐸(?̃?) − 𝛽var(?̃?) = 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘) − 𝛽𝜎2. 
Then, in the first stage, the government should choose 𝜃 such that 
 𝑘
∗ = 𝜃[𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2]𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
). 
In the second stage, the reform is based on the government’s lockup policy 𝜆(𝑎), taking into 
account the payoff of the N-holder with time preference 𝛿 ≤ 𝛿𝑛:  
 𝜋𝑁(𝑎) = 𝑝𝜆(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆 − 𝑐(𝑎) = [𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘) − 𝛽𝜎2]𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆(𝑎) − 𝑐(𝑎). 
We again find an efficient solution, as stated in the following proposition. The proof is availa-
ble in the Appendix. 
Proposition 3. A staged privatization program {𝜃, 𝜆(⋅)} can transform a firm into an effi-
cient firm with the first-best investments 𝑎∗ and 𝑘∗ if the N-holder of the firm has time pref-
erence 𝛿 satisfying 
Page 15 of 34 
 𝛿 ≤ 𝛿𝑛 −
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
𝑎∗
0
, 
where the amount 𝜃 of tradable shares in the first stage of privatization is determined by 
𝑘∗ = 𝜃𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗)𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
), 
and the lockup policy in the second stage of privatization is defined by 
𝜆(𝑎) =
{
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln {𝛿 +
1
1 − 𝜃∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
𝑎
0
}
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
,   if  𝑎 < 𝑎∗,
 
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln {𝛿 +
1
1 − 𝜃∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
𝑎∗
0
}
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
,  if  𝑎 ≥ 𝑎∗.  ∎
 
 
The results in Propositions 2 and 3 indicate that, if risk and/or risk aversion is high 
enough and if the economy is large enough (𝑛 → ∞), virtually all N-holders will be enticed by 
the privatization scheme to improve their firms before unlocking their shares. The end result 
is that these firms will become efficient market-based firms.  
4.2. One-Time Privatization under a Complete Contract 
Suppose now that the government takes a complete-contract approach. In this case, a 
lockup is announced and committed ex ante. The payoff of an N-holder with time preference 
𝛿 ≤ 𝛿𝑛 is  
𝜋𝑁(𝑎) = 𝑝𝜆(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆 − 𝑐(𝑎) = 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆 − 𝑐(𝑎). 
Since 𝜆 is independent of 𝑎, the first-order condition (FOC) 𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) = 0 implies 

𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆 = 𝑐′(𝑎). (17) 
This indicates that the efficient condition 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘) = 𝑐′(𝑎) can never be satisfied. Hence, we 
know that staged privatization with a pre-determined lockup is inefficient.  
Then, government policies {𝜃, 𝜆} are determined by 

max
𝑎,𝑘,𝜆,𝜃
 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘) − 𝑟𝑘 − 𝑐(𝑎)
   s.t.   𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆 = 𝑐′(𝑎),
            𝑘 = 𝜃𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘)𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
) .
 
The following proposition shows that the optimal lockup is 𝜆∗ = 0 in this case. The proof is in 
the Appendix. 
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Proposition 4. If the lockup is decided ex ante, the optimal lockup is to have no lockup. That 
is, a one-time privatization is optimal. This solution is inefficient. 
The difference between the two privatization strategies can be understood as the differ-
ence between complete and incomplete contracts. Our solutions indicate that, if a lockup is 
chosen ex ante, it cannot be dependent on effort and the optimal solution is inefficient; on the 
other hand, if a lockup is chosen ex post (after effort is invested), it can be dependent on effort 
and the optimal solution is efficient.  
5. Empirical Analysis 
5.1. The Empirical Model 
In this section, we offer empirical analysis on staged privatization in China. Although 
staged privatization is typical in privatization programs around the world, for an empirical 
study, we can only find rich data from China. For China, economic growth hinges almost 
exclusively on privatization and its privatization program has been characterized by step-by-
step privatizations. This privatization process involves a large number of firms, covering all 
industrial sectors. Our empirical analysis is based on the companies listed on China’s two 
stock exchanges. Among all publicly listed companies in China (over 1,400 firms), more than 
60% of them are SOEs. This provides us with a rich set of data to test our theory.  
The first stage of the most recent privatization program in China started in 1990, which 
led to the creation of China’s stock exchanges in 1990 and 1991. After that, the publicly listed 
SOEs became partially privatized SOEs and the shares of all the listed firms except four, in-
cluding private firms, were divided into tradable and nontradable shares. From then on, SOEs 
refer to partially privatized SOEs. An N-holder in China is either a legal-person shareholder, 
who receives dividends just like a T-holder, or the government. A legal person is an institution 
or a person, including a foreigner, who is entitled to the legal rights and responsibilities of a 
contract. While T-holders obtain their shares from the stock market, N-holders obtain their 
shares through various other means. For example, when a firm or the government wants to 
introduce a strategic partner (including another firm or a foreigner), it negotiates with the 
potential partner for a portion of the firm’s equity at an agreed price. With the introduction of 
the second stage of the privatization program (the SS reform) in 2005, as a holder of non-
tradable shares and typically with a large shareholding, a legal-person holder has incentives to 
improve the firm. Even when a holder is the government, we have ample evidence that it 
makes an effort to improve SOEs. The central government actively puts pressure on local 
governments to improve the firms’ situations. In fact, the central government sets specific 
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targets for local governments to satisfy within certain time limits. These targets are aimed at 
meeting the requirements of the SS reform. 
N-holders play an important role in the Chinese reform. A few factors determine their im-
portance. First, they are typically large shareholders (very large by Western standard with 
each typically having 30-60% share holdings). N-holders in a Chinese firm are always among 
the biggest five shareholders. These shareholders control most of the important management 
positions. In contrast, managers’ shareholdings are negligible and T-holders are usually scat-
tered and each holds a tiny portion of the firm. Second, holders of N-shares receive the same 
amount of dividend as holders of T-shares. Third, N-holders are often local governments or 
institutions that are closely related to or controlled by local governments. Some firms intro-
duce foreign investors as legal-person holders. Although foreign involvement is small overall, 
in those firms in which foreigners are involved, foreigners typically hold a large portion of the 
shares (28% on average). In this situation, commitment from N-holders serves as a signal to 
the market that they will continue to contribute to the firm rather than expropriate minority 
shareholders by cashing out their investment at the earliest opportunity. Hence, lockups in the 
Chinese reform may be an effective way to mitigate moral hazards. This is a key component of 
our theoretical model.  
Our theory predicts that firms making a larger restructuring effort and hence giving a bet-
ter performance will be selected for the SS reform earlier. We will test two implications of this 
prediction. Firstly, better performance can be an indication that N-holders have made suffi-
cient effort on a firm. Hence, we will test whether firms with higher profitability are selected 
for the reform earlier. Secondly, N-holders’ recommendations and evaluations can heavily 
influence a CEO’s promotion or demotion, particularly since N-holders are often local gov-
ernments or institutions that are closely related to or controlled by local governments. If so, 
the sensitivity of turnover to performance will reflect the effect of N-holders’ incentive 
schemes on CEOs. Hence, we will test whether the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance 
is higher for firms that went through the reform earlier.  
The Chinese capital market is considered to be immature because of weak investor protec-
tion, an inactive takeover market, ineffective external monitoring by large shareholders, high 
ownership concentration, low managerial ownership, and the dominance of state ownership. 
La Porta et al. (1998, 2000) and Volpin (2002) found evidence that corporate governance in 
such an environment is poor and that managers are highly entrenched. Further, SOEs both in 
developed and developing markets are known to have multiple tasks, which may lower their 
incentive to maximize profit and market value. One mechanism for dealing with this problem 
consists of promotion and demotion. We indeed find that the government employs promo-
tions and demotions as a measure to entice top managers of SOEs to work hard. We find that 
the top manager turnover rate is about 18% in our sample. Similar findings were presented by 
Chang & Wong (26%, 2009), Kato & Long (24%, 2006), and Firth et al. (40%, 2006). These 
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rates are higher than those in the US as documented by Denis et al. (13%, 1995) and Huson et 
al. (9%, 2004) and those in Japan as documented by Kang et al. (13%, 1995) and Kaplan (15%, 
1994). The higher turnover rate may explain the higher sensitivity of turnover to performance 
in China. Hence, our dependent variable is the turnover of the top manager; moreover, we will 
use an ordered multiple choice indicator rather than the traditional binary choice indicator as 
the dependent variable. This multi-choice indicator can indicate a manager’s many career 
changes, including a demotion, a promotion or a lateral change of jobs, while the binary choice 
indicator can only indicate whether or not a turnover was voluntary.  
5.2. Data and Variables 
Our data comes from two major sources. Financial data is obtained from China Stock 
Market & Accounting Research (CSMAR). CSMAR covers daily market transactions, including 
financial and corporate governance data of all listed firms in China. Information on the desti-
nations of departing managers is collected from firms’ annual reports and internet publica-
tions.  
We trace the career paths of departing managers in SOEs, including both former govern-
ment officials appointed by governments and professional managers hired by governments. 
We define turnover as when a manager departs. There were a total of 1104 turnovers in the 
SOEs from 2001 to 2006. Some turnovers were voluntary such as a resignation due to health 
problems, but others were forced such as an early termination of a manager’s contract. Some 
turnovers were punishments such as demotions, some were rewards such as promotions, yet 
others were lateral changes of jobs with no implication of a demotion or promotion. In order 
to distinguish among these different cases of departure, we trace the destinations of the de-
parting managers. We manually collected this data from firms’ annual reports and internet 
publications, which are available at www.baidu.com. We find that, among the departures of 
CEOs, 219 were promotions, 640 were demotions, 17 were lateral movements, and 49 were 
retirements. We  could not find related information for the other 179 cases. So our dependent 
variable is a multi-choice indicator, which is equal to −1 if the CEO was demoted, 1  if the 
CEO was promoted, and 0  if it was a lateral movement, official retirement or no change.  
Our empirical analysis focuses on CEO turnover among listed firms whose ultimate con-
trollers are the central and local governments. We exclude banks, insurance companies and 
other financial firms because they use different accounting measures. If there are multiple 
turnovers in a certain year, we count the first observation only. We treat short-term turnovers 
as outliers, and we do not expect frequent turnovers to be correlated with the firm’s perfor-
mance. The average annual turnover rate of CEOs is found to be about 18%.  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of all variables of interest for the study period. To 
measure a firm’s performance, we generate four variables—ROA, ROE, Tobin’s Q, and a loss 
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indicator. ROA is the industry-adjusted return on asset and is defined as the difference be-
tween a firm’s ROA and the industry mean, where a firm’s ROA is calculated as the ratio of 
earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets. Similarly, ROE is the industry-adjusted 
return on equity and is defined as the difference between a firm’s ROE and the industry mean, 
where a firm’s ROE is calculated as the ratio of EBIT to total equity. While ROA and ROE 
measure a firm’s accounting performance, we use Tobin’s Q as an approximation of a firm’s 
market value, which is calculated by dividing the sum of firm equity value, book value of long-
term debt, and net current liabilities by total assets. Furthermore, to differentiate financially 
distressed firms from healthy ones, we generate a dummy called “loss”. This dummy is 1  if a 
firm’s EBIT is less than zero and 0  otherwise. We are also interested in a firm’s growth, so we 
generate a variable called “growth rate” which is measured by the difference between a firm’s 
sales growth rate and the industry mean. 
We generate three more dummy variables. “First mover” is a dummy that indicates when 
the firm went through the SS reform; it is 1 if the firm was selected for the SS reform in 2005 
and 0  otherwise. “Institutional share” is a dummy that reflects a firm’s ownership structure; it 
is 1 if the percentage of shares held by institutional shareholders is larger than 10% and 0 
otherwise. “Political connection” is a dummy that distinguishes professional managers from 
managers who were former bureaucrats; it is 1  if the manager had worked for the central or a 
local government before and 0  otherwise.   
We also control for CEO age and a firm’s size measured by the logarithm of total assets. 
Last but not least, we generate a variable called “hierarchy” that indicates whether a firm is 
stand-alone or affiliated with a pyramidal group; it is equal to the number of hierarchy levels 
from the ultimate controlling parent firm to the listed firm of interest. 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the discrete variables. It shows that 
during the study period, the turnover rate of top managers is around 18%. About 5% of the top 
managers were promoted to higher positions, while more than 13% of them were demoted. It 
also indicates that about 8% of the listed firms generated negative benefits, and more than 22% 
of the managers in listed SOEs had political connections and were former bureaucrats. Panel B 
of Table 1 presents the mean, standard deviation, minimum and maximum for each of the 
continuous variables. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Panel A:  
 
1 0 -1 
  
CEO turnover 4.48% 82.42% 13.10%   
First mover 13.75% 86.25%    
Loss 8.03% 91.97%    
Institutional share 61.20% 38.80%    
Political connection 22.08% 77.92%    
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Panel B: 
 
Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA 4882 0.083 4.697 -16.342 10.534 
ROE 4684 0.135 9.269 -36.024 18.943 
Growth rate 4106 0.007 1.071 -4.619 2.100 
Firm size 4883 12.140 0.974 8.934 17.914 
Largest shareholding (%) 4878 46.162 16.106 8.07 85 
CEO age 4852 46.005 6.854 25 74 
Hierarchy 4860 2.294 0.991 1 5 
 
5.3. Empirical Results 
Our theoretical model predicts that well-performing firms will be allowed to unlock their 
N-shares early. We first test this prediction by univariate comparisons. The firms went 
through the SS reform in groups, one group at a time. Excluding the initial experimental group, 
a total of 65 groups went through the SS reform over time. We gather every 10 groups in con-
secutive reform time into one batch, so that we can compare firms that went through the 
reform during different time periods. We have a total of 7 batches. Table 2 contains the com-
parison statistics between the first batch and a later batch. Table 2 indicates that early reform 
firms tend to have a high ROA, ROE and market value. For example, the average industry-
adjusted ROA for firms in the first batch is almost 6, while that for firms in the second batch is 
only 3.2, and it drops further to 1.9 for firms in the third batch. The t-tests show that these 
differences between the firms in the first batch and later batches are statistically significant. 
The same conclusion can be found on other performance measures such as industry-adjusted 
ROE, industry-adjusted sales growth rate and Tobin’s Q. Also, we find that firm sizes in differ-
ent batches are not significantly different from each other, indicating that the difference in 
performance is not due to firm size. This preliminary evidence supports our theory.  
Table 2: Statistics for Firms in Different Reform Batches 
 ROA Sales Growth Rate ROE Market Value No. of Observations 
First Batch 5.798 0.284 8.905 3.42E+09 259 
     20.64% 
Second Batch 3.265*** 0.179*** 5.259*** 2.59E+09*** 263 
 t=-6.737 t=-4.579 t=-3.735 t=-3.744 20.96% 
Third Batch 1.885*** 0.211*** 1.76*** 2.39E+09*** 320 
 t=-12.129 t=-2.350 t=-5.780 t=-3.170 25.50% 
Fourth Batch 0.085*** 0.275 -13.133** 1.34E+09*** 227 
 t=-14.049 t=0.161 t=-1.847 (2) t=-18.492 18.09% 
Fifth Batch 0.835*** 0.837 4.172*** 8.70E+09 63 
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 t=-4.284 t=1.558 t=-2.453 t=-0.801 5.02% 
Sixth Batch -1.202*** 1.56*** -3.12*** 2.00E+09*** 64 
 t=-2.824 t=2.625 t=-2.906 t=-4.327 5.10% 
Last Batch -3.412*** 0.438*** -89.26** 1.65E+09*** 59 
 t=-3.060 t=0.707 t=-1.706 (2) t=-8.459 4.70% 
In this table and the rest, *** indicates significance at the 1% level; ** indicates significance at the 5% level; and * 
indicates significance at the 10% level. 
 
Next, we test whether managers were rewarded for good performance. Based on our theo-
retical model and the privatization literature, we predict that state shareholders will use pro-
motions and demotions to motivate CEOs. Groves et al. (1995) and Pinto et al. (1993) argued 
that since managers’ incentive plays an important role in the long process of privatization, 
they should be monitored in the intermediate period. Groves et al. (1995) found that demo-
tions and promotions greatly motivated managers in 769 SOEs during 1980 and 1989 in China. 
Also, Fredrickson et al. (1988) and Gibelman & Gelman (2002) found that social and political 
factors played a role in determining managerial turnover. Although the Chinese Corporate 
Law requires CEOs to be determined and monitored by the board of directors, the state share-
holder can exercise control through its controlling shareholdings and its authority in the ap-
pointment and dismissal of CEOs. Also, in Chinese SOEs, ownership tends to be concentrated 
and the board tends to be controlled by members who are directly or indirectly affiliated with 
the ultimate controller (the government). Through its control, the government can use promo-
tions and demotions as the incentive mechanism for CEOs. Our theoretical analysis also im-
plies that managers in well-performing firms are more likely to be promoted and managers in 
badly performing firms are more likely to be demoted and that the sensitivity of turnover to 
performance will be larger for firms going through the SS reform earlier. 
The regression results using an ordered-logit model are presented in Table 3. As ex-
plained before, we use an ordered multiple choice indicator rather than the traditional binary 
choice indicator as the dependent variable. For checking the robustness of our regressions, we 
use both accounting-based and market-based measures of a firm’s performance. 
Table 3: Ordered Logit Regressions6 
                                                        
6 In all our regressions, we regard the person holding the title of general manager or chief executive as CEO. 
Also, to remove outliers, all the accounting measures are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Performance is defined as ROA ROA ROE ROE Growth rate Growth rate Loss Loss 
Performance 0.035***  0.030***  0.021***  0.018***  0.134***  0.121***  -0.412***  -0.343**  
 (4.39)  (3.49)  (5.19)  (4.17)  (3.70)  (3.18)  (-3.07)  (-2.47)  
First mover×Performance  0.047*   0.032**   0.144   -1.182**  
  (1.97)   (2.52)   (1.19)   (-2.33)  
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In Models (1) and (2) of Table 3, we use the industry-adjusted ROA to measure a firm’s 
performance. Model (1) shows that the probability that a CEO is demoted is significantly lower 
and the probability that a CEO is promoted is significantly higher for firms with a higher 
adjusted ROA. Further, if the adjusted ROA increases by one standard deviation from the 
mean, the probability that the CEO is demoted decreases by about 2% and the probability that 
the CEO is promoted increases also by about 2%. In Model (2), to test whether the sensitivity 
of turnover is affected by policy burdens involving privatization, we add the interaction term 
between the first mover and the adjusted ROA to the regression model. The dummy First 
Mover is 1 if the firm is selected to go through the SS reform in 2005 and 0 otherwise. About 
20% of the firms went through the reform in 2005. It indicates the extent to which the man-
gers in the SOEs have achieved the political task. Model (2) shows that the sensitivity of CEO 
turnover to performance increases significantly if a firm is selected to go through the reform 
early. Further, if a firm’s adjusted ROA increases by one standard deviation from the mean 
and the firm is in an earlier reform batch, the probability that the CEO is demoted decreases 
by about 2.5% and the probability that the CEO is promoted increases by about 1% more than 
they do for a firm whose adjusted ROA also increases by one standard deviation but which is 
in a later reform batch. 
Following the literature on CEO turnover, we add further control variables. We use the 
logarithm of total assets to control for firm size. Big firms tend to have a large impact on the 
economy and they may be more challenging to operate. Hence, managers in big firms may 
accumulate more management experience. Chang & Wong (2009), Kato & Long (2006) and 
Firth et al. (2006) found that managers in large firms are less likely to be forced to leave. We 
also found that managers in big firms are more likely to be promoted.  
Firm size 0.115***  0.111***  0.100**  0.093**  0.135***  0.132***  0.125***  0.125***  
 (2.81)  (2.72)  (2.36)  (2.19)  (3.05)  (2.98)  (3.07)  (3.08)  
Largest shareholding -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.003  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  -0.002  
 (-1.15)  (-1.15)  (-1.23)  (-1.18)  (-0.92)  (-0.87)  (-0.97)  (-0.94)  
Institutional share -0.197**  -0.198**  -0.181**  -0.180**  -0.119  -0.119  -0.158**  -0.151*  
 (-2.48)  (-2.49)  (-2.23)  (-2.21)  (-1.42)  (-1.43)  (-2.01)  (-1.92)  
CEO age 0.004  0.011  0.192  0.204  0.968  0.967  -0.029  -0.045  
 (0.01)  (0.02)  (0.33)  (0.36)  (1.57)  (1.57)  (-0.05)  (-0.08)  
Political connection -0.185**  -0.175*  -0.203**  -0.194**  -0.250**  -0.245**  -0.189**  -0.183**  
 (-2.05)  (-1.93)  (-2.21)  (-2.11)  (-2.52)  (-2.47)  (-2.09)  (-2.03)  
Hierarchy -0.029  -0.029  -0.024  -0.023  -0.035  -0.034  -0.037  -0.038  
 (-0.74)  (-0.73)  (-0.61)  (-0.57)  (-0.82)  (-0.81)  (-0.96)  (-0.98)  
Cut1 -0.863  -0.894  -0.958  -1.017  -0.126  -0.150  -0.763  -0.758  
Cut2 4.135  4.108  4.045  3.993  4.827  4.804  4.222  4.230  
No. of observations 4818 4818 4624 4624 4062 4062 4816 4816 
Log Likelihood -2701.87 -2699.95 -2590.42 -2587.31 -2300.09 -2299.41 -2706.37 -2703.87 
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On monitoring, Brunello et al. (2003) did not find evidence that large minority share-
holders will monitor managers effectively in Italy. However, Denis et al. (1997) found that 
large monitory shareholders play an important role in monitoring managers in the US. In 
Table 3, we found that the existence of large institutional shareholders will increase forced 
turnovers, indicating that large minority shareholders play an important role in monitoring 
CEOs in China. 
We further control for other variables relating to ownership structure and political con-
nections. The biggest shareholder naturally has more incentive to monitor the manager, im-
plying a higher turnover rate. Volpin (2002) found that the existence of a large stakeholder 
will enhance the negative link between CEO turnover and performance. However, a large 
enough shareholder may press the manager to expropriate minority shareholders, resulting in 
a low turnover rate. In Table 3, we show that the two effects cancel each other out and the 
percentage of shares held by the largest shareholder does not have a significant effect on the 
turnover rate.  
We use the number of hierarchy levels to control for ownership structure. Volpin (2002) 
found that this number will not affect the relationship between turnover and performance 
regardless of whether a firm is standalone or affiliated with a pyramidal group. Our findings 
confirm that the length of the largest shareholder’s control chain will not significantly affect 
the turnover rate.  
We use a political dummy to distinguish professional managers from managers who are 
former bureaucrats. This dummy is 1 if the manager has worked for the central or local gov-
ernments before and 0 if otherwise. Claessens & Djankov (1999) found that managers ap-
pointed by state owners perform worse than those appointed by private owners. However, 
political connections are regarded as an important resource in China. We include this variable 
to test whether a manager’s political connection will influence his/her current career. Table 3 
shows that a bureaucratic appointment increases the probability of demotion. Also, as a man-
ager approaches the official retirement age, he/she is more likely to be replaced regardless of 
the firm’s performance. Hence, we control for CEO age in our regressions. However, we find 
that CEO age has no significant effect on the turnover rate.  
We also consider alternative measures of a firm’s performance. In Models (3) and (4) of 
Table 3, we use the industry-adjusted ROE to measure a firm’s performance. In Models (5) 
and (6), we use the industry-adjusted annual sales growth rate. We find that our main conclu-
sions are robust to these alternative performance measures.  
Also, Kaplan (1994) found that CEO turnover in Japanese firms are most sensitive to neg-
ative earnings. Chang & Wong (2009) found that the sensitivity of performance to turnover is 
more pronounced when a firm is making a loss. Hence, in Models (7) and (8), we use a loss 
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dummy as a performance measure. This dummy is 1 if a firm’s earnings before interest and 
tax are less than zero and 0 if otherwise. Our main conclusions still hold with this loss measure.  
Further, if we use the industry median rather than the mean to adjust the industry effect, 
if we use an absolute control dummy rather than the percentage of shares held by the largest 
shareholder, if we use an age dummy rather than the continuous age variable, if we use a 
dummy to separate central-government-owned firms from local-government-owned firms, or 
if we remove official retirements from our turnover sample, our main conclusions still hold.  
Finally, to check the robustness of our main conclusions further, we use the traditional 
binary choice indicator as the dependent variable. This binary choice indicator separates 
forced turnovers from voluntary ones only. Furthermore, to control for the time-invariant firm 
fixed effect, we use the fixed-effect logit regression model for panel data rather than the simple 
cross-section data analysis; the latter ignores the correlation of the fixed effects in the same 
firm across time. The regression results are presented in Table 4. Again, our main conclusions 
hold under this specification.  
Table 4: Fixed-Effect Logit Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Performance is defined as ROA ROA ROE ROE Growth rate Growth rate Loss Loss 
Performance -0.039*** -0.034*** -0.021*** -0.018***  -0.107**  -0.100**  0.369**  0.286*  
 (-3.40) (-2.78) (-3.87)  (-3.13)  (-2.42)  (-2.14)  (2.30)  (1.72)  
First mover×Performance  -0.073*  -0.039*   0.066   -1.391**  
  (-1.65)  (-1.86)   (-0.46)   (-2.00)  
Firm size -0.313** -0.311** -0.306*  -0.300*  -0.408**  -0.402**  -0.311**  -0.302**  
 (-2.04) (-2.02) (-1.88)  (-1.84)  (-2.15)  (-2.11)  (-2.02)  (-1.96)  
Institutional share 0.231** 0.221** 0.210*  0.195*  0.230**  0.231**  0.203*  0.192*  
 (2.15) (2.05) (1.89)  (1.76)  (2.02)  (2.03)  (1.90)  (1.79)  
Largest shareholding 0.016* 0.017** 0.019**  0.020**  0.017*  0.017*  0.016**  -0.018**  
 (1.94) (2.02) (2.23)  (2.34)  (1.82)  (1.84)  (1.96)  (-2.11)  
CEO age 0.011 0.012 0.011  0.011  -0.004  -0.004  0.012  0.012  
 (1.29) (1.33) (1.23)  (1.28)  (-0.39)  (-0.39)  (1.36)  (1.42)  
Political connection 0.077 0.066 0.036  0.027  0.199  0.197  0.082  0.070  
 (0.51) (0.44) (0.23)  (0.18)  (1.14)  (1.14)  (0.54)  (0.46)  
Hierarchy -0.141 -0.127 -0.120 -0.102 -0.187 -0.185 -0.111 -0.090 
 (-0.89) (-0.80) (-0.74) (-0.63) (-1.04) (-1.03) (-0.70) (-0.57) 
No. of observations7 2820 2820 2656  2656  2126  2126  2819  2819  
Log Likelihood -956.51 -955.10 -900.35  -898.51  -736.83  -736.73  -959.48  -957.41  
 
In summary, our empirical findings are consistent with our theory. First, we find that bet-
ter performing firms, as measured by higher ROA, ROE, and market value, were selected to go 
through the SS reform earlier. Second, the sensitivity of CEO turnover to performance is high-
                                                        
7 The number of observations drops significantly from the earlier regressions since a fixed-effect regression 
excludes firms that have no turnover during the whole period. 
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er for firms that were selected to go through the reform in 2005 (the first year of the SS re-
form). Specifically, CEOs in firms that were selected for the reform earlier were more likely to 
be promoted if the firms performed well and were more likely to be demoted if the firms per-
formed badly.  
6. Concluding Remarks 
Developed economies have shown a fondness for staged privatization through their well-
developed stock markets. Even in developing countries, staged privatization through stock 
markets have been gaining popularity in recent years. This study provides a theory on staged 
privatization. We identify an efficient approach to privatize based on an incomplete-contract 
approach. This theory can explain the popularity of staged privatization around the world. We 
also offer empirical evidence in support of our theory. 
A private firm’s IPO also features an initial lockup, which typically lasts 180 days. There 
are many explanations for IPO lockups. Brav & Gompers (2003) proposed three: a signal for 
firm quality, a commitment device to alleviate moral hazard, and a mechanism for underwrit-
ers to extract additional compensation from the issuing firm. Our theory offers a new under-
standing of IPO lockups from a unique angle.  
 
Appendix 
Lemma 1: Existence and Uniqueness of 𝜽 
Lemma 1. If 𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗) > 𝑘∗ and 𝑛 is sufficiently large, then equation (7) has a unique solution 
of 𝜃 ∈ (0,  1). 
Proof. Denote 𝜙(𝜃) ≡ 𝜃𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗)𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
). We have  
𝜙(0) = 0      and       𝜙(1) = 𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗)𝐹−1 (1 −
1
𝑛
). 
Since lim
𝑛→∞
𝐹−1 (1 −
1
𝑛
) = 1 and 𝑓(𝑎∗, 𝑘∗) > 𝑘∗, when 𝑛 is sufficiently large, we have 
𝜙(0) < 𝑘∗ < 𝜙(1). 
Hence, by continuity of 𝜙, there is at least one 𝜃∗ ∈ (0,   1) such that 𝜙(𝜃∗) = 𝑘∗. 
Further, we have  
𝜙′(𝜃) ≡ 𝑦∗𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
) −
𝜃𝑦∗
𝑛
1
𝑓 [𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛)]
, 
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where 𝑓 is the density function of 𝐹. Hence, we have  
lim
𝑛→∞
 𝜙′(𝜃) = 𝑦∗ > 0. 
That is, when 𝑛 is sufficiently large, 𝜙 is strictly increasing. Therefore, 𝜃∗ is unique.  
Proof of Proposition 1 
Given the profit function in (5), with 𝑘 = 𝑘∗,we have 
𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) = 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎) + 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)(1 − 𝜃)𝜆′(𝑎)𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎) ln (
𝛿
𝛿𝑛
) − 𝑐′(𝑎). 
Consider a general lockup policy 𝜆(𝑎) of the following form: 
 𝜆(𝑎) = { 
𝜆(𝑎) if  𝑎 < 𝑎∗,
𝜆0 if  𝑎 ≥ 𝑎
∗,
 
where 𝜆0 ∈ [0, 1] is an arbitrary constant. For 𝑎 ≥ 𝑎
∗, for any 𝜆0 in [0, 1], we have 
𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) = 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆0𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆0 − 𝑐′(𝑎). 
Since 𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎∗) < 0 and 𝜋𝑁(𝑎) is concave in 𝑎 for 𝑎 ≥ 𝑎
∗, we have 𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) < 0 for all 𝑎 ≥ 𝑎∗. This 
means that, in [𝑎∗, ∞), the N-holder will choose 𝑎∗. 
On the other hand, for 𝑎 < 𝑎∗, we need 𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) > 0 or 
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗) + 𝜆′(𝑎)𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) ln (
𝛿
𝛿𝑛
) >
𝑐′(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
 , 
or 
 𝜆′(𝑎) <
1
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) ln(𝛿 𝛿𝑛⁄ )
[
𝑐′(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
− 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗)]. 
If we take 𝐴(𝑎) ≡ [𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
]
−1
, then 𝜆(𝑎) =
ln[𝛿𝑛𝐴(𝑎)]
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
. Hence, inequality (20) becomes: 
𝐴′(𝑎)
𝐴(𝑎)
<
1
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)
[𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗) − 𝑐′(𝑎)
𝐴(𝑎)
1 − 𝜃
]. 
It is satisfied if 
𝐴′(𝑎)
𝐴(𝑎)
= −
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)
𝐴(𝑎)
1 − 𝜃
, 
which implies  
𝑑𝐴−1(𝑎) =
1
1 − 𝜃
𝑑𝑐(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)
. 
Then, the above implies 
𝐴−1(𝑎) = 𝐶 +
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)
𝑎
0
, 
where 𝐶 is an arbitrary constant. Obviously, 𝐴(𝑎) is decreasing, implying that 𝜆(𝑎) is decreas-
ing. Also, since  
𝜆(𝑎) =
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln𝐴
−1(𝑎)
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
, 
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We have 
𝜆′(𝑎) = −
1
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
[𝐴−1(𝑎)]
′
𝐴−1(𝑎)
= −
1
(1 − 𝜃)ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
1
𝐴−1(𝑎)
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)
< 0,
𝜆′′(𝑎) =
1
(1 − 𝜃)ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
{
[𝐴−1(𝑎)]′
[𝐴−1(𝑎)]2
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)
−
1
𝐴−1(𝑎)
𝑐′′(𝑎)𝑓 − 𝑐′(𝑎)𝑓𝑎
[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)]
2 } .
 
If 𝑐(𝑎) has a constant marginal cost 𝑐(𝑎) = 𝛾𝑎, then we have 𝜆′′(𝑎) > 0, i.e., 𝜆(𝑎) is convex. 
Hence, as shown in Figure 2, this reform policy is downward sloping and convex.  
Although this 𝐶 can be arbitrary, we do need to restrict it to ensure 0 ≤ 𝜆(𝑎) ≤ 1. To have 
𝜆(𝑎) ≥ 0 for all 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎∗, since 𝜆(𝑎) is decreasing, we need 𝜆(𝑎∗) ≥ 0 only. That is,  𝐴−1(𝑎∗) ≤ 𝛿𝑛, 
or 
𝐶 ≤ 𝛿𝑛 −
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)
𝑎∗
0
. 
To have 𝜆(𝑎) ≤ 1 for all 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎∗, since 𝜆(𝑎) is decreasing, we need 𝜆(0) ≤ 1 only. That is, 𝐶 ≥ 𝛿. 
Hence, we need the following condition to ensure 0 ≤ 𝜆(𝑎) ≤ 1: 
𝛿 ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝛿𝑛 −
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)
𝑎∗
0
. 
Such a 𝐶 exists if and only if condition (6) is satisfied. In other words, as long as the time 
preference 𝛿 of the N-holder satisfies (6), we can identify a proper 𝜆(𝑎) to induce 𝑎∗. The end 
result is an efficient market-based firm. 
If the marginal cost of effort is constant and is small relative to output, then any N-holder 
with 𝛿 < 𝛿𝑛 will be enticed by the reform program to improve the firm. In a large economy 
with 𝑛 → ∞, we have 𝛿𝑛 → 1, implying that virtually any N-holder has enough incentive to 
improve the firm.  
Finally, we can simply take 𝐶 = 𝛿. Then, although unnecessary, we can choose the follow-
ing 𝜆0 to ensure continuity of 𝜆(⋅):  
𝜆0 = 𝜆(𝑎
∗) =
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln [𝛿 +
1
1 − 𝜃∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)
𝑎∗
0
]
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Given the profit function in (11), with 𝑘 = 𝑘∗,we have 
𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) = [1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)]𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
                 +[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)]𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)(1 − 𝜃)𝜆′(𝑎)𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)ln (
𝛿
𝛿𝑛
) − 𝑐′(𝑎).
 
Consider a general lockup policy 𝜆(𝑎) of the following form: 
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 𝜆(𝑎) = {
𝜆(𝑎) if  𝑎 < 𝑎∗,
𝜆0 if  𝑎 ≥ 𝑎
∗.
 
For 𝑎 ≥ 𝑎∗, 𝜆(𝑎) can take any constant 𝜆0 ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we have 
𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) = 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)](1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆0𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆0 − 𝑐′(𝑎). 
Since 𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎∗) < 0 and 𝜋𝑁(𝑎) is concave in 𝑎, we have 𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) < 0 for all 𝑎 ≥ 𝑎∗. This means that, 
in [𝑎∗, ∞), the N-holder will choose 𝑎∗. 
On the other hand, for 𝑎 < 𝑎∗, we need 𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) > 0 or 
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗) + 𝜆′(𝑎)𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)ln (
𝛿
𝛿𝑛
) >
𝑐′(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)]𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
, 
or 
 𝜆′(𝑎) <
1
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) ln(𝛿 𝛿𝑛⁄ )
[
𝑐′(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)]𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
− 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗)]. 
If we take 𝐴(𝑎) ≡ [𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
]
−1
, then 𝜆(𝑎) =
ln[𝛿𝑛𝐴(𝑎)]
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
. Hence, inequality (22) becomes 

𝐴′(𝑎)
𝐴(𝑎)
<
1
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)
[𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗) − 𝑐′(𝑎)
𝐴(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)]
], 
which is satisfied if 
𝐴′(𝑎)
𝐴(𝑎)
= −
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)
𝐴(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)]
, 
which implies  
(1 − 𝜃)𝑑𝐴−1 =
𝑑𝑐(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)]
, 
implying  
𝐴−1(𝑎) = 𝐶 +
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)]
𝑎
0
. 
where 𝐶 is a free parameter. Since 
𝜆(𝑎) =
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln𝐴
−1(𝑎)
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
, 
we have  
𝜆′(𝑎) = −
1
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
[𝐴−1(𝑎)]
′
𝐴−1(𝑎)
= −
1
(1 − 𝜃) ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗)]
1
𝐴−1(𝑎)
< 0. 
Hence, this lockup policy is downward sloping. 
Although this 𝐶 can be arbitrary, we do need to restrict it to ensure 0 ≤ 𝜆(𝑎) ≤ 1. To have 
𝜆(𝑎) ≥ 0 for all 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎∗, since 𝜆(𝑎) is decreasing, we need 𝜆(𝑎∗) ≥ 0 only. That is,  𝐴−1(𝑎∗) ≤ 𝛿𝑛, 
or 
𝐶 ≤ 𝛿𝑛 −
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)]
𝑎∗
0
. 
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To have 𝜆(𝑎) ≤ 1  for all 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎∗,  since 𝜆(𝑎)  is decreasing, we need 𝜆(0) ≤ 1  only. That is, 
𝐴−1(0) ≥ 𝛿, i.e., 𝐺 ≥ 𝛿. Hence, we need the following condition to ensure 0 ≤ 𝜆(𝑎) ≤ 1: 
𝛿 ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝛿𝑛 −
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)]
𝑎∗
0
. 
Such a 𝐶 exists if and only if (12) is satisfied. In other words, as long as the time preference 𝛿 
of the N-holder satisfies (12), we can identify a proper 𝜆(⋅) to induce 𝑎∗. We can simply take 
𝐶 = 𝛿. Then, we can choose the following 𝜆0 to ensure continuity of 𝜆(⋅):  
𝜆0 = 𝜆(𝑎
∗) =
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln𝐴
−1(𝑎∗)
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
=
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln {𝛿 +
1
1 − 𝜃∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)[1 − 𝛽𝜎2𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗)]
𝑎∗
0
}
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
. 
Proof of Proposition 3 
Given the profit function in (15), with 𝑘 = 𝑘∗,we have 
𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) = 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
                 +[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2](1 − 𝜃)𝜆′(𝑎)𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)ln (
𝛿
𝛿𝑛
) − 𝑐′(𝑎).
 
Consider a general lockup policy 𝜆(𝑎) of the following form: 
 𝜆(𝑎) = {
𝜆(𝑎) if  𝑎 < 𝑎∗,
𝜆0 if  𝑎 ≥ 𝑎
∗.
 
For 𝑎 ≥ 𝑎∗, 𝜆(𝑎) can take any constant 𝜆0 ∈ [0, 1]. Then, we have 
𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) = 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆0𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆0 − 𝑐′(𝑎). 
Since 𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎∗) < 0 and 𝜋𝑁(𝑎) is concave in 𝑎, we have 𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) < 0 for all 𝑎 ≥ 𝑎∗. This means that, 
in [𝑎∗, ∞), the N-holder will choose 𝑎∗. 
On the other hand, for 𝑎 < 𝑎∗, we need 𝜋𝑁
′ (𝑎) > 0 or 
𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗) + 𝜆′(𝑎)[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2]ln (
𝛿
𝛿𝑛
) >
𝑐′(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
, 
or 
 𝜆′(𝑎) <
1
[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2] ln(𝛿 𝛿𝑛⁄ )
[
𝑐′(𝑎)
(1 − 𝜃)𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
− 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗)]. 
If we take 𝐴(𝑎) ≡ [𝛿𝜆(𝑎)𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆(𝑎)
]
−1
, then 𝜆(𝑎) =
ln[𝛿𝑛𝐴(𝑎)]
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
. Hence, inequality (25) becomes: 

𝐴′(𝑎)
𝐴(𝑎)
<
1
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
[𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗) − 𝑐′(𝑎)
𝐴(𝑎)
1 − 𝜃
]. 
Assume 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) > 𝛽𝜎2 for all 𝑎 ∈ [0, 𝑎∗]; if this is not satisfied, the output has no social value. 
Equation (26) is satisfied if 
𝐴′(𝑎)
𝐴(𝑎)
= −
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
𝐴(𝑎)
1 − 𝜃
, 
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implying 
(1 − 𝜃)𝑑𝐴−1 =
𝑑𝑐(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
, 
implying 
𝐴−1(𝑎) = 𝐶 +
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
𝑎
0
, 
where 𝐶 is a free parameter. Since 
𝜆(𝑎) =
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln𝐴
−1(𝑎)
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
, 
we have  
𝜆′(𝑎) = −
1
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
[𝐴−1(𝑎)]
′
𝐴−1(𝑎)
= −
1
(1 − 𝜃) ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
1
𝐴−1(𝑎)
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
< 0,
𝜆′′(𝑎) =
1
(1 − 𝜃) ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
1
𝐴−1(𝑎)
                ⋅ [
𝑐′(𝑎)
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
[𝐴−1(𝑎)]
′
𝐴−1(𝑎)
−
𝑐′′(𝑎)[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2] − 𝑐′(𝑎)𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘
∗)
[𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2]
2 ] .
 
Hence, the lockup policy 𝜆(𝑎) is decreasing. If the marginal cost is constant, 𝜆(𝑎) is also con-
vex.  
Although this 𝐶 can be arbitrary, we do need to restrict it to ensure 0 ≤ 𝜆(𝑎) ≤ 1. To have 
𝜆(𝑎) ≥ 0 for all 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎∗, since 𝜆(𝑎) is decreasing, we need 𝜆(𝑎∗) ≥ 0 only. That is,  𝐴−1(𝑎∗) ≤ 𝛿𝑛, 
or 
𝐶 ≤ 𝛿𝑛 −
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
𝑎∗
0
. 
To have 𝜆(𝑎) ≤ 1  for all 𝑎 ≤ 𝑎∗,  since 𝜆(𝑎)  is decreasing, we need 𝜆(0) ≤ 1  only. That is, 
𝐴−1(0) ≥ 𝛿, i.e., 𝐶 ≥ 𝛿. Hence, we need the following condition to ensure 0 ≤ 𝜆(𝑎) ≤ 1: 
𝛿 ≤ 𝐶 ≤ 𝛿𝑛 −
1
1 − 𝜃
∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
𝑎∗
0
. 
Such a 𝐶 exists if and only if (16) is satisfied. In other words, as long as the time preference 𝛿 
of the N-holder satisfies (16), we can identify a proper 𝜆(⋅) to induce 𝑎∗. We can simply take 
𝐶 = 𝛿. Then, we can choose the following 𝜆0 to ensure continuity of 𝜆(⋅):  
𝜆0 = 𝜆(𝑎
∗) =
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln𝐴
−1(𝑎∗)
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
=
ln 𝛿𝑛 − ln {𝛿 +
1
1 − 𝜃∫
𝑑𝑐(𝜏)
𝑓(𝜏, 𝑘∗) − 𝛽𝜎2
𝑎∗
0
}
ln(𝛿𝑛 𝛿⁄ )
. 
Proof of Proposition 4 
The Lagrange function for problem (18) is 
𝐿 = 𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘) − 𝑟𝑘 − 𝑐(𝑎) + 𝜇1[𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆 − 𝑐′(𝑎)] + 𝜇2 [𝜃𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘)𝐹
−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
) − 𝑘]. 
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The FOCs are 

0 = 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘) − 𝑐′(𝑎) + 𝜇1[𝑓𝑎𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆 − 𝑐′′(𝑎)] + 𝜇2𝜃𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘)𝐹
−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
) ,
0 = 𝑓𝑘(𝑎, 𝑘) − 𝑟 + 𝜇1𝑓𝑎𝑘(𝑎, 𝑘)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆 + 𝜇2 [𝜃𝑓𝑘(𝑎, 𝑘)𝐹
−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
) − 1] ,
0 = 𝜇1𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆ln (
𝛿
𝛿𝑛
) ,
0 = −𝜇1𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘)𝛿
𝜆𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆 + 𝜇2 {𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘)𝐹
−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
) −
𝜃
𝑛
𝑓(𝑎, 𝑘)
𝑓 [𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛)]
} .
 
When 𝑛 is large enough, we have  
𝐹−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
) <
𝜃
𝑛
. 
Hence, we know 𝜇1𝜇2 < 0. By the third FOC, we know that 𝜆 must take a corner value, either 0 
or 1. By (17), we have 𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘) > 𝑐′(𝑎). Then, by multiplying the first FOC by 𝜇2, we have 
𝜇2[𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘) − 𝑐′(𝑎)] + 𝜇1𝜇2[𝑓𝑎𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘)(1 − 𝜃)𝛿
𝜆𝛿𝑛
1−𝜆 − 𝑐′′(𝑎)] + 𝜇2
2𝜃𝑓𝑎(𝑎, 𝑘)𝐹
−1 (1 −
𝜃
𝑛
) = 0. 
Hence, we have 𝜇2 < 0, implying 𝜇1 > 0. Therefore, we have 𝜆 = 0. 
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